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PLEADING AS INFORMATION-FORCING
ALEX REINERT*
I
INTRODUCTION
1

The federal pleading standards announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell
2
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly have occupied the attention of academics, jurists,
and practitioners since their announcement. Iqbal alone has, as of this writing,
been cited by more than 26,000 courts, more than 500 law review articles, and
3
innumerable briefs and motions. Interested observers, including the Federal
Judicial Center, many academics, and this author, have tried to estimate the
4
empirical effect of the decisions, with differing results. Others, including some
participants in this symposium, have criticized Iqbal and Twombly for altering
the meaning of the Federal Rules outside of the traditional procedures
5
contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act. Almost all commentators, however,
Copyright © 2012 by Alex Reinert.
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. This article has benefited
substantially from the insight offered by participants at the Institute for Law & Economic Policy’s
Access to Justice Symposium, most notably Stephen B. Burbank and the Honorable Denise L. Cote. In
addition, I wish to thank participants in the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law’s Junior Faculty
Workshop and Adam Steinman for comments on an earlier draft.
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2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3. These figures were generated using the KeyCite function on the Westlaw database, on August
8, 2011.
4. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) recently released a study that concluded that Iqbal has not
resulted in a statistically significant increase in dismissals in most categories of cases. JOE CECIL ET AL.,
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (Fed. Jud. Center, Mar. 2011),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/ library/fjc_catalog.nsf. Unfortunately, the FJC’s data are limited, having
excluded all pro se matters, all cases involving prisoners, and any motions involving qualified immunity.
See id. at 6. I am currently conducting a more complete analysis of motion activity both before and after
Iqbal, the results of which will be forthcoming. Other scholarship suggests that Iqbal and Twombly are
having a significant impact on the quality and quantity of federal litigation. See, e.g., Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553,
556 (2010) (estimating that motions to dismiss were four times more likely to be granted after Iqbal as
they were during the Conley era, after controlling for relevant variables); Alexander A. Reinert, The
Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011) (suggesting that Iqbal and Twombly standards
will not provide a better filter for weeding out meritless cases).
5. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of
Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2010); Helen Hershkoff & Arthur R.
Miller, Celebrating Jack H. Friedenthal: The Views of Two Co-authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 28–29
(2009); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 84–89 (2010); cf. James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand
Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493, 538–39 (2011)
(suggesting that Court’s decisions in Iqbal and Twombly might reflect its own frustration with the
rulemaking process).
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agree that Iqbal and Twombly mark a break from the liberal pleading doctrine
6
enunciated in 1957 by Conley v. Gibson. It is hard to avoid this conclusion,
given the Twombly Court’s explicit rejection of at least one well-worn sentence
from Conley. But exactly how much has changed is up for debate, and there are
certainly well respected commentators who have suggested that Iqbal and
Twombly are not necessarily as consequential as most academics seem to
7
believe.
This article does not deign to answer exactly how much Iqbal and Twombly
have changed pleading. From my own reading of the two cases as well as lower
courts’ attempts to interpret them, it is clear that pleading is a different animal
than it was before 2007. But even more striking is the confusion that the two
cases have created for the advocates and judges who have to grapple with the
new pleading standard. Even the Supreme Court has continued to sow the
confusion, by citing to pre-Twombly pleading law instead of Iqbal or Twombly
8
in a recent case. This article suggests a source of this confusion distinct from the
Court’s own lack of clarity in explaining the decisions, and then tries to relate
this confusion to two poles of pleading principles that appear to be operating in
lower court interpretations of the cases.
The source of confusion at focus here is linguistic. Iqbal and Twombly have
created havoc not simply because they upended settled expectations about the
nature of pleading. Had the decisions clearly articulated the new pleading
standard, it might have been subject to the same criticisms summarized above,
but at least it would have been easier for lower courts to apply. Instead the
Court shifted standards by using familiar words in a completely new manner.
The Court’s new standard places an emphasis on the words “conclusory” and
“plausible,” words that it had used before, but never in the way that it did in
9
Iqbal and Twombly. The term “conclusory,” for example, had rarely been
invoked by the Supreme Court in the pleading context; when it did so, it was to
condemn legal, not factual, conclusions, as insufficient on their own to make a
complaint viable. By contrast, conclusory factual allegations were fatal in legal
contexts that involved the assessment of evidence—for example, summary
judgment, “good cause” in discovery—but pleading has never been a site for
sifting evidence. Thus, prior to Iqbal, what was to be disregarded as
“conclusory” at the pleading stage differed from what was to be disregarded at
other procedural stages. At least one reading of Iqbal collapses this procedural6. See Reinert, supra note 4, at 121–25 & nn.11–24 (reviewing literature).
7. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473
(2010) (arguing for limited reading of Twombly and Iqbal); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (suggesting that Iqbal and Twombly can be read consistently with prior
precedent).
8. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). Even though Skinner was not focused on the
sufficiency of pleading, it did not take long for commentators in the academy to wonder whether there
was significance in the omission of Iqbal and Twombly. See Howard Wasserman, Some Hints (or
Further Confusion) About the State of Pleading, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 11, 2011, 9:21 EST),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/03/reading-pleading-tea-leaves.html.
9. See infra Part III.
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based meaning of “conclusory,” creating an evidentiary standard of proof at the
pleading stage where it never before had existed. Similar comparisons can be
10
made of the Court’s use of the word “plausible.” The end result is a pleading
inquiry that begins to look evidentiary in nature, an observation that has led
some to view Iqbal and Twombly as merging the Rule 12 and Rule 56
11
inquiries.
This leads to the second major point of this article: namely that conducting
an evidentiary inquiry at the pleading stage has a distinct danger apart from
12
criticisms that have been made by other commentators. It poses the risk of
substituting for notice pleading something analogous to an “informationforcing” rule. Information-forcing rules are typically associated with, but not
13
confined to, contract doctrine. In any event, the key insight of informationforcing rules is that it can sometimes be efficient to impose a penalty default on
the party who fails to make known information that is asymmetrically in his
possession. That is, where one party has better (or cheaper) access to relevant
information, sometimes it makes sense to create incentives for that party to
produce that information. As applied to pleading, however, the rationale loses
its appeal, at least as to those kinds of information that are predictably
unavailable to the pleader. For instance, it has often been observed that
allegations regarding a defendant’s state of mind are difficult to plead with
specificity, because of the profound informational asymmetry that exists with
regard to state of mind evidence. And even for categories of facts to which a
pleader may have better access than her opponent, one should still have a good
reason for forcing that information out at the pleading stage rather than at a
later stage of litigation.
There may be scenarios in which information-forcing principles could have
limited application for pleading rules. For instance, where plaintiffs have access
to private information, asking them to include it in their complaint at the
pleading stage may be consistent with, if not mandated by, familiar informationforcing rationales. Similarly, where there is publicly-available information, there
may be circumstances in which information-forcing pleading principles have
purchase. But where the defendant has access to relevant information, and the
plaintiff cannot access it, adopting an information-forcing rule that requires
pleading beyond the requirements of notice pleading would be inappropriate.
Even if one concludes that information-forcing principles may have limited
10. Indeed, Ed Brunet has made similar observations about the Court’s use of the word
“plausible” in prior summary judgment decisions. Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of
“Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1, 3–8 (2010). Below, I expand on this by considering the Court’s use of the term “plausible” in
other evidentiary contexts. Infra Part III.B.
11. See Miller, supra note 5, at 34; Suja A. Thomas, Pondering Iqbal: The New Summary Judgment
Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010).
12. There are Seventh Amendment concerns, for instance. See Thomas, supra note 11. And, of
course, there are concerns about subverting the traditional role of pleading. See sources cited at supra
note 5.
13. See infra Part V.A.
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application at the pleading stage, it is important to recognize that the
procedural stage of the lawsuit may affect how stringently courts should apply
the principle. Courts have, and should, insist on more information-forcing at the
summary judgment stage than at the pleading stage, for instance. On this view,
the failing of Iqbal and Twombly is that each case assumes the merits of an
information-forcing pleading rule without analyzing whether the rule should
apply to the kinds of allegations at issue in the case or whether the Rule
12(b)(6) stage is the appropriate place to impose information-forcing norms.
II
IQBAL AND TWOMBLY IN BRIEF REVIEW
Understanding the significance of Iqbal and Twombly requires some
recourse to history. One must begin with the changes to pleading ushered in by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938. The Rules sought to
eradicate the technicalities of claim-specific pleading that had dominated legal
14
practice for decades. Commentators too numerous to count have reviewed and
remarked upon the pleading changes enacted by the Federal Rules, noting that
they embraced a gradual but significant turn to reliance on discovery and trial
15
to determine merit rather than technical rules of pleading. Rule 8, requiring
only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
16
17
entitled to relief,” was key to accomplishing this transition. “Fact” pleading,
which the Federal Rules were meant to displace, too often “led to wasteful
disputes about distinctions that [the drafters] thought were arbitrary or
18
metaphysical, too often cutting off adjudication on the merits.” As originally
conceived, Rule 12(b)(6) motions would test the sufficiency of complaints not
by reference to the facts alleged in the complaint, but by reference to whether
19
there was a legal claim that could be supported by the facts alleged.
The seminal case interpreting the new federal pleading rules, of course, was
14. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438–40 (1986).
15. E.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990–91
(2003); see also Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52
HOW. L.J. 73, 76–77 (2008) (summarizing history of pleading standards and functions from medieval
origins onward). For an overall history of the Federal Rules, see generally Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
17. The goal of the Federal Rules was to create both simplicity and uniformity in pleading and to
prevent premature dismissals. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 439 (“Rule 8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to
avoid use of the charged phrases ‘fact,’ ‘conclusion,’ and ‘cause of action.’”).
18. Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Plausible Denial: Should Congress
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 148 (2009) (Stephen Burbank in
rebuttal).
19. As such, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were meant to address the rare circumstance in which a
plaintiff’s claim for relief could be supported by no valid legal theory. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank &
Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 399, 407 (2011); Burbank, supra note 5, at 1191–92.
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20

the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson, in which the Court
interpreted Rule 8 to focus on the notice given to the defendant of the nature of
the plaintiff’s lawsuit rather than on the relationship of particular pleaded facts
to the legal claims at issue. The Court treated pleading as a way of “facilitat[ing]
21
a proper decision on the merits” by giving a defendant “fair notice of what the
22
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Thus, according to
Conley, a complaint satisfied Rule 8 without “set[ting] out in detail the facts
23
upon which [the claimant] bases his claim.” To the extent that a defendant
sought additional facts, the Conley Court was satisfied that Rule 12(e), among
24
other devices, would suffice. As for the role of Rule 12(b)(6) motions, true to
the original understanding of the drafters of the Federal Rules, the Conley
Court referred to “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
25
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”
Thus, after Conley, Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) had a complex
interrelationship. First, as to the sufficiency of factual allegations, Rule 8
required only “notice” pleading, not detailed facts. Second, Rule 12(b)(6) was
to be used in those rare cases in which there was no viable legal theory to
support a plaintiff’s claim. A complaint, then, could satisfy Rule 8, but still be
26
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Finally, to the extent that a partyopponent believed that a complaint provides insufficient factual detail, Rule
12(e), not Rule 12(b)(6), was one of many available procedural remedies.
Rule 8’s notice pleading standard dominated the resolution of pre-discovery
27
motions, at least rhetorically, for decades. Until Twombly and Iqbal, the
Supreme Court maintained a relatively consistent commitment to Conley’s
notice pleading rule, twice unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standards
28
in civil rights and employment discrimination cases. The Court even

20. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
21. Id. at 48.
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 48 n.9.
25. Id. at 45–46.
26. Bank of Abbeville & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 201 F. App’x 988, 990
(5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999).
27. Christopher Fairman has argued that notice pleading has rarely been the rule, at least in
practice, pointing to examples from antitrust, RICO, environmental, civil rights, intellectual property,
and defamation cases, among others, in which lower courts have constructed a variety of heightened
pleading standards. See Fairman, supra note 15, at 998–1011 (summarizing different categories of
heightened pleading).
28. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (explaining that discovery and
summary judgment, not heightened pleading requirements, are the proper means for disposal of
unmeritorious suits); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (stating that the heightened pleading standard for § 1983 claims against
municipalities is “impossible to square . . . with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the
Federal Rules”); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate
that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most
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acknowledged that there might be “practical merits” to heightened fact
29
pleading, but reminded the lower courts that such changes may be obtained
30
only “‘by the process of amending the Federal Rules,’” not by judicial fiat.
Everything changed with the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. In the
former, the Court adopted a “plausibility” standard in an antitrust case,
expressing its concern, specifically in the antitrust context, that liberal pleading
rules, combined with expansive discovery, would pressure defendants to settle
31
weak or meritless cases. There were at least three notable aspects of Twombly.
32
First, the Court overruled in part Conley v. Gibson. In particular, Twombly
“retired” the language from Conley that cautioned district courts not to dismiss
a case for insufficient pleading unless the court can conclude that “the plaintiff
33
can prove no set of facts” consistent with the defendant’s liability. Second,
Twombly suggested that the “plausibility” of a plaintiff’s complaint played a
role in resolving whether a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be
34
granted. This language had not been used with reference to Rule 12’s
35
standards in the past. Finally, the Twombly Court seemed to ground its
decision largely in concerns that threats of burdensome discovery extracted
36
settlements from defendants, even for claims of dubious merit. In the Court’s
view, careful case-management by district courts had not proven successful in
37
reducing these risks.
Although many lower courts took note of Twombly, substantial questions
lingered. Some lower courts considered the possibility that Twombly was
limited to cases in which the costs of discovery were likely to be high and
38
settlement-forcing. For others, Twombly was interpreted to apply broadly to
39
all civil actions. The Court’s decision in Iqbal resolved this short-lived dispute
by making it clear that plausibility pleading applied in all civil cases, not just
40
antitrust claims.
Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for evaluating the sufficiency of a

effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”).
29. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
30. Id. (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168).
31. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 559–60 (2007).
32. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
33. 550 U.S. at 561–63 (reviewing criticisms of Conley and concluding that expansive language of
the case “has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough”).
34. Id. at 556–57.
35. See Brunet, supra note 10, at 3–8 (reviewing use of word “plausible” in summary judgment
context).
36. 550 U.S. at 558–59.
37. Id. at 559.
38. E.g., Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2009) (suggesting
that Twombly was limited to “expensive, complicated litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009); Total Benefits Planning
Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008).
40. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009).
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41

complaint. First, courts must review each allegation in a complaint and exclude
42
from consideration those allegations that are stated in a “conclusory” fashion.
In announcing this new gloss on pleading, the Court also held that allegations of
43
state of mind, despite the explicit language of Rule 9(b), must be alleged with
44
some factual detail. The second step, the plausibility analysis, assesses the fit
45
between the non-conclusory facts alleged and the relief claimed. Iqbal made it
clear that the judge’s role in plausibility analysis was one that called for the
46
exercise of “judicial experience and common sense,” a surprising turn from the
47
judicial role contemplated in Conley.
Despite the contrast between the framework contemplated by the Conley
Court and the drafters of the Federal Rules with that introduced by Iqbal and
Twombly, the recent opinions disclaimed any intent to adopt a heightened fact
48
pleading standard. Unsurprisingly, however, lower courts are confused as to
49
the precise ramifications of the cases. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, the
contrast is “perplexing” and leaves courts unsure whether to apply “the more
50
lenient or the more demanding standard.”
Some of the confusion surrounding application of Iqbal is surely generated
by inconsistencies within the opinion itself. For instance, on the issue of
“conclusory” allegations, the Court focused attention on what was common
knowledge prior to both Twombly and Iqbal: allegations that are mere “legal
conclusions” or that are “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
51
action” will not suffice at the pleading stage. Yet in applying this definition,
the Court seemed to treat two very similar paragraphs of the Iqbal complaint

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1954 (interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) to require more than “general” allegations for
state of mind even where neither fraud nor mistake is alleged). The Iqbal Court’s interpretation of Rule
9(b), which states that “conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally,” is arguably at odds
with both the Rule’s text and the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9, Advisory
Committee Notes to 1937 Adoption (citing ENGLISH RULES UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACT (The
Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r. 22). The English rules cited by Rule 9 state that when a plaintiff makes
allegations as to any “condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a
fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred.” Jeff Sovern,
Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud
Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 146 n.19 (1985). Moreover, as some courts have recognized, the Iqbal Court’s
treatment of Rule 9(b) is in some tension with its prior decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506
(2002). See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009); Brown v. Castleton
State Coll., 663 F. Supp. 2d 392, 403 n.8 (D. Vt. 2009); cf. Kasten v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009
WL 3628012, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (stating that tension between Swierkiewicz and Iqbal has
yet to be resolved).
44. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50.
45. Id. at 1950.
46. Id.
47. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957).
48. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
49. See infra Part III.
50. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2011).
51. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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differently. Thus, an allegation that two defendants approved of a policy to hold
52
detainees under certain conditions was treated as factual. A separate
allegation that the same defendants approved of a policy of treating detainees
53
more harshly based on their protected class status was treated as conclusory.
While there are differences between these allegations, at root both alleged that
54
the defendants approved of two different policies.
In explaining the meaning of “plausible,” the Court has also been less than
clear. Plausibility is something more than mere possibility or conceivability, the
55
Court has told us, but something less than a preponderance test. In addition,
courts can come to a conclusion about the plausibility of a complaint by taking
56
account of “judicial experience and common sense.” Courts have struggled to
comprehend the outer limits of plausibility and the role of their own experience
when adjudicating a motion that historically has not involved determinations of
57
fact.
In sum, Iqbal and Twombly adopt “plausibility” pleading instead of
Conley’s notice pleading, taking the relatively distinct roles accorded Rules 8,
12(b)(6), and 12(e), and conflating them to introduce a heightened fact pleading
58
regime in direct conflict with the original purposes of the Federal Rules. In so
doing, the Court may have made factual screening a function of Rule 12(b)(6)
59
and made Rule 12(e) “essentially irrelevant.” Under notice pleading, a
complaint was sufficient if the allegations, taken as true, created the possibility
that the pleader will be entitled to some kind of relief. Under Iqbal and
Twombly, what might have passed muster under Conley may no longer be
sufficient. The following examples illustrate some of the differences between
the standards:
Imagine that a plaintiff alleged simply that “Defendant violated my
constitutional rights.” This allegation would almost surely be insufficient under
both notice pleading and plausibility pleading. Under notice pleading, it does
not provide enough information for the defendant to prepare an answer or
defenses. Under plausibility pleading, it is a bare legal conclusion and nothing
more.
Now imagine a little more detail, in which the plaintiff claims that
“Defendant violated my right to equal protection under the law.” Without any
other facts, this too would likely be insufficient under both notice pleading and
plausibility pleading. There are many ways in which a defendant may violate the
52. Id. at 1951 (reviewing paragraph 69 of complaint).
53. Id. (reviewing paragraph 96 of complaint).
54. Indeed, both policies also were unlawful. It just so happened that one of the unlawful
policies—the one implicated by paragraph 69—was not before the Court whereas the other—the one
implicated by paragraph 96—was before the Court.
55. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
56. Id.
57. See infra Part III.
58. Burbank, supra note 5, at 1191–92.
59. Id. at 1192.
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equal protection clause, and this allegation provides no factual context
whatsoever. Even notoriously vague Form 11, which alleges that a plaintiff was
injured by the defendant’s “negligence,” at least purports to identify the
60
location and time of the injury.
Now imagine that plaintiff alleged the following: “On ** Date, Defendant
fired me because of my race, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” Under
notice pleading, so long as the defendant is governed by the Fifth Amendment,
61
this would likely be sufficient. Under plausibility pleading, at least some courts
have said that it would be insufficient, because there are no factual allegations
to support the contention that the termination was “because of” race, and the
62
“because of” allegation cannot be taken as true on its own.
Finally, imagine that plaintiff alleges “On ** Date, Defendant fired me and
replaced me with J. Doe, a less qualified white person. Defendant’s termination
violated the Fifth Amendment.” This clearly would satisfy notice pleading, and
for some courts that would find the previous allegation insufficient, this would
likely satisfy plausibility pleading as well. It provides some factual detail from
which one could draw a plausible inference of discrimination. Not all courts
63
applying plausibility pleading would be satisfied with this, however.
It is difficult to know what motivated the Court in Twombly and Iqbal to
seemingly abandon the traditional means for making changes to the Federal
Rules: rule-making through the process contemplated by the Rules Enabling
Act. One story to tell about the transition from Conley to Iqbal and Twombly is
that of a Court that only recently lost faith in a notice pleading standard,
perhaps as a result of judgments about the practicalities of modern litigation.
But it is important to acknowledge the Court’s embrace of notice pleading had
shown some limitations, as evidenced by the Court’s flirtation with heightened
64
pleading well before Iqbal and Twombly. Given the Court’s own seeming
ambivalence about Conley—at least in particular categories of cases like
antitrust and civil rights—one can better understand lower courts’ willingness to
announce temporary departures from a pure notice pleading standard, even
65
before Twombly and Iqbal.

60. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007) (implicitly approving of Form
11’s allegations under plausibility pleading).
61. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
62. Perhaps the best example of this is Iqbal itself. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950
(2009).
63. See cases discussed infra Part III.A & B.
64. See Fairman, supra note 15, at 997 & nn.79–81 (summarizing aspects of Court’s jurisprudence
in which commitment to notice pleading wavered).
65. At various times, some circuit courts adopted heightened pleading standards in civil rights
cases. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001); Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d
1288, 1293–94 (10th Cir. 1997); Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917, 921–22 (6th Cir. 1995); Babb v. Dorman,
33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994); Kartseva v. Dep’t of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 865 F. Supp. 789, 798–99 (M.D. Ala. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 102
F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 1997). By the time that Twombly was announced, however, most circuit courts had
recognized that their heightened pleading standards could not survive the Supreme Court’s decisions in
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III
LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF IQBAL AND TWOMBLY
It is early yet to offer a definitive conclusion of Iqbal and Twombly’s effect
on lower courts’ treatment of motions to dismiss. Some empirical evidence
suggests that district courts have granted a significantly higher percentage of
motions to dismiss post-Iqbal, particularly in areas involving civil-rights
66
litigation. In addition, a review of lower court opinions suggests that, despite
the Court’s disclaimer that neither Twombly nor Iqbal imposes a heightened
pleading standard, lower courts are in a state of confusion as to how to square
that language with the Court’s two holdings. It is impossible to capture the
nuance of all of these decisions, so here I will try to hit on some of the broad
themes that are sowing confusion in the lower courts.
A. Lower Court Explication of “Conclusory”
The first key question prompted by Iqbal is how courts are to distinguish
67
between “factual” and “conclusory” allegations. Iqbal offers courts some
guidance in this inquiry: an allegation that merely mirrors the elements of a
68
cause of action is conclusory and not to be credited. But this guidance is
69
limited, and on its face does not necessarily mark a break from past practice.
Many lower courts, however, have taken Iqbal beyond the Court’s stated
definition. For instance, lower courts have disagreed as to whether allegations
70
which fail to distinguish among defendants are by definition conclusory or not.
Leatherman, Crawford-El, and Swierkiewicz. See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)
(noting that Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard for qualified immunity cases had been
overruled in 1995); Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1124–26 (9th Cir. 2002) (overruling
cases which applied heightened pleading standard to civil rights claims); Goad v. Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497,
502–03 (6th Cir. 2002) (overruling Veney in light of Crawford-El); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916
(10th Cir. 2001) (overruling Breidenbach in light of Crawford-El); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496,
499 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that Crawford-El rejected D.C. Circuit’s heightened pleading standard).
But see Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (continuing to apply heightened pleading
to civil rights claims). Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit has now interpreted Iqbal to reject a heightened
pleading standard for civil rights claims. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010).
66. See Hatamyar, supra note 4.
67. The Third Circuit described the process for evaluating a complaint after Iqbal as follows:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must
accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal
conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
68. See supra Part II.
69. By this, I mean that almost all lower courts, pre-Iqbal, would have found a complaint lacking if
all it did was repeat the elements of a cause of action without any additional factual amplification.
70. Compare Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding allegations conclusory
because they do not distinguish among different defendants), and Warren v. Luzerne Cnty., No. 3:CV09-0946, 2010 WL 521130, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010) (same), and In re Travel Agent Comm’n
Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903–04 (6th Cir. 2009) (same), and Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset,
692 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210 (D.P.R. 2010) (same), and Short v. Sanzberro, No. 1:09-cv-00996-OWW-GSA
PC, 2009 WL 5110676, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (finding failure to distinguish among defendants
fatal to § 1983 claim), with Brenes-Laroche v. Toledo Davila, 682 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184–85 (D.P.R. 2010)
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There has been some disagreement about whether the Form Complaints
71
incorporated by the Federal Rules are now inadequate under Iqbal.
There are also many differences of opinion among lower courts as to the
conclusoriness of particular categories of allegations under Twombly and Iqbal.
Sometimes the difficulty is addressing allegations that are a mix of law and fact,
72
73
74
such as allegations as to disability, dangerousness, and bribery, to take only
a few examples. Relatedly, some courts treat allegations as to whether a private
75
individual is acting under color of law as factual, and others treat it as
76
conclusory. There is similar variation as to allegations regarding corporate

(finding sufficient allegations that did not distinguish among different defendants, at least for certain
claims), and Narodetsky v. Cardone Indus., Inc., No. 09-4734, 2010 WL 678288, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24,
2010) (same), and Consumer Protection Corp. v. Neo-Tech News, No. CV 08-1983-PHX-JAT, 2009 WL
2132694, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2009) (finding references to defendants generally sufficient).
71. Compare Mark IV Indus. Corp. v. Transcore, L.P., No. 09–418 GMS, 2009 WL 4403187, at *2–
4 (D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009) (denying, in patent action, the motion to dismiss because the complaint’s
allegations conform with Form 18 of the FRCP), with Anthony v. Harmon, No. CIV. 2:09-2272 WBS
KJM, 2009 WL 4282027, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (stating that Form complaints “have been
cast into doubt”), and Doe v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 09-245 WBS CMK, 2009 WL
2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009) (calling into question whether, after Iqbal, the FRCP Form
Complaints are still sufficient); cf. The Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Tienda La Mexicana, Inc., No. 5:09-CV00021, 2009 WL 4363450, at *2, *5 (W.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2009) (finding allegation that insured
“negligently” caused fire sufficient to state a claim for breach of insurance contract).
72. See Lawson v. Ellison Surface Techs., Inc., No. 10-11-DLB, 2010 WL 935361, at *1–2 (E.D. Ky.
March 10, 2010) (finding allegation that plaintiff is disabled, without alleging facts that show he satisfies
this condition, is conclusory). But see Doe v. Astrue, No. C 09-00980 MHP, 2009 WL 2566720, at *13
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (finding allegation that plaintiff was “otherwise qualified” for benefits was
not conclusory).
73. See Stevens v. Spegal, No. 4:09CV1394MLM, 2010 WL 106603, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 2010)
(finding allegations that snow blade constituted a “dangerous condition” and that it presented a
“reasonably foreseeable risk of harm” were conclusory); see also Altman v. HO Sports Co., Inc., No.
1:09-cv-1000 AWI SMS, 2009 WL 4163512, at *4–6, *8–9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2009) (finding allegations
that product did not meet consumer expectations, that product defects were substantial causes of
plaintiff’s injuries, and that there was an inadequate warning of a “known risk of injury” were
conclusory without explanation of why the product did not meet expectations, how it caused injury, and
what warnings were insufficient).
74. See Dauphinais v. Cunningham, No. 3:08-cv-1449 (VLB), 2009 WL 4545293, at *3–4 (D. Conn.
Nov. 30, 2009) (finding plaintiff’s allegation that he believed defendant had bribed state officials was
conclusory). But see Halpin v. David, No. 4:06cv457-RH/WCS, 2009 WL 2960936, at *2–3 (N.D. Fla.
Sept. 10, 2009) (“That a defendant took a bribe is a factual allegation that must be accepted as true.”).
75. See Carpenter v. Kloptoski, No. 1:08-CV-2233, 2010 WL 891825, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10,
2010) (finding extensive factual allegations sufficient to support claim of private actor acting under
color of law); Huxtable v. Geithner, No. 09cv1846 BTM (NLS), 2009 WL 5199333, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 23, 2009) (finding allegation that private lender defendants are effectively acting as government
agents for federal loan program was sufficient to allege action under color of law).
76. See McCain v. Episcopal Hosp., 350 F. App’x 602, 604–05 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding allegation
that private hospitals acted under color of state law was conclusory); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
186, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a Fourth Amendment claim was implausible because it “did
not allege that the defendants were engaged in a law-enforcement effort;” instead, the facts showed
that the defendants’ actions were those of a government employer retrieving its property from
terminated employees and escorting them off the premises); Claudio v. Sawyer, 675 F. Supp. 2d 403,
407–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding allegation that off-duty officer was acting under color of law was
conclusory in the absence of factual showing that officer was acting in capacity as police officer).
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77

status. Even allegations relating to the status of plaintiffs, tinged with both
legal and factual elements, have been subjected to varying treatment by lower
78
courts.
For the purposes of many civil rights claims, allegations of a defendant’s
state of mind are perhaps most significant, and unsurprisingly these kinds of
allegations have been heavily litigated post-Iqbal. Part of the source of the
79
confusion is that, after Iqbal, it is unclear whether Swierkiewicz is still good
80
law in employment discrimination cases. The Supreme Court itself has
contributed to the confusion: in Iqbal, the Court made no mention of
81
Swierkiewicz despite the parties’ focus on the case. In a recent decision,
however, the Court treated Swierkiewicz as a relevant precedent for pleading
82
purposes, failing even to cite to Iqbal and Twombly. There is thus a broad
dispute over whether “general” allegations of state of mind are sufficient on
77. See Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding allegation that
Wal-Mart exercised control over day-to-day employment so as to constitute a joint employer was
conclusory); Robles v. Copstat Sec., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 9572(SAS), 2009 WL 4403188, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec 2, 2009) (finding allegations that defendant was sole shareholder, directed the “day-to-day
operations,” that company “is currently a ‘shell entity,’ and no longer engages in business,” and
“maintains few, if any, assets,” and that assets “have been transferred to [defendant]” were “rather
general,” but sufficient to support veil-piercing theory); Cortelco Sys. of P.R. Inc. v. Phoneworks, Inc.,
No. 09-1371CCC, 2009 WL 4046794, at *3 (D.P.R. Nov. 20, 2009) (finding allegation of alter ego status
is conclusory); Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2009) (in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case, finding allegation that corporate officer made
decisions about hours, schedules, and benefits was sufficient to add individual as defendant). Tracy can
be compared to Trustees of the Road Carriers Local 707 Welfare Fund v. Goldberg, No. 08-CV-0884
(RRM) (MDG), 2009 WL 3497493, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009), in which plaintiffs’ allegations that
the defendant exercised authority and control with respect to employee and employer contributions
were conclusory, but plaintiffs’ further allegations that defendant was the president and principal
shareholder of the company at issue, was the individual responsible for making payment to the fund on
behalf of the company, and used such contributions as company assets were sufficiently specific to
establish defendant as a fiduciary with respect to the fund.
78. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 28 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding
allegation that relator in qui tam action was “original source” was conclusory when based on allegation
that relator had “direct and independent knowledge of information on which the allegations are based,
and have provided such information to the United States before filing suit, as required by 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(4)”); Haskins v. VIP Wireless Consulting, No. 09-754, 2009 WL 4639070, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
2, 2009) (in FLSA action, finding allegation that plaintiff was not a salaried employee was not
conclusory).
79. 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that a complaint alleging employment discrimination need not
allege specific facts establishing every element of an employment discrimination case, but instead must
only provide a short and plain statement of a valid claim in accordance with Conley).
80. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming that
Swierkiewicz is still good law); Kasten v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 30, 2009) (“[R]ead together, Swierkiewicz and Twombly require employment discrimination
plaintiffs to allege sufficient material facts to state a plausible claim for relief, but do not mandate doing
so on every element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.”); EEOC v. Scrub, Inc., No. 09 C
4228, 2009 WL 3458530, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009) (affirming that Swierkiewicz is still good law).
81. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions in Iqbal cite Swierkiewicz. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). All of the parties to the case discussed its significance, however. See Brief for
Petitioners at 8, 37–38, 39, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015); Brief for Respondent
Javaid Iqbal at 7, 9, 23, 24, 35–36, 39–42, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015).
82. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011).
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83

their own. Courts differ over whether allegations of discriminatory or
84
retaliatory intent are factual or conclusory. They differ over whether an
allegation that a defendant “knew” or was “aware” of a particular fact is
85
86
conclusory or factual.
As some of these examples suggest, there has been the hint of required fact
pleading in certain areas of litigation. Some courts have suggested that

83. Compare Brenes-Laroche v. Toledo Davila, 682 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186–87 (D.P.R. 2010)
(general allegations of defendants’ state of mind found sufficient), and Young v. Speziale, No. 07-03129
(SDW-MCA), 2009 WL 3806296, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2009) (stating general allegations may be
sufficient in deliberate indifference context), and Henderson v. Fries, No. 1:09-CV-268-TS, 2009 WL
3246673, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2009) (finding it sufficient for plaintiff to state that plaintiff had a
serious medical need in jail and that jail officials denied him medical attention), with First Med. Health
Plan, Inc. v. CaremarkPCS Caribbean, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 111, 119 (D.P.R. 2010) (finding general
allegation of state of mind insufficient), and Cuevas v. City of New York, No. 07 civ. 4169(LAP), 2009
WL 4773033 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 7, 2009) (general allegations of Monell liability insufficient; complaint was
“heavy on descriptive language” but “light on facts”), and Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-cv-269-XR, 2009
WL 2567866, at *4–5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009) (finding allegation that defendants acted with
deliberate indifference is conclusory).
84. For cases treating discriminatory allegations alone as conclusory, see, for example, Holmes v.
Poskanzer, 342 F. App’x 651, 653 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding allegation that defendants were “not
impartial” was conclusory and, without facts to support actual bias or conflict of interest, could not
state due process claim); Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 692 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210 (D.P.R. 2010);
Delgado-O’Neil v. City of Minneapolis, No. 08-4924 (MJD/JJK), 2010 WL 330322, at *10–11 (D. Minn.
Jan. 20, 2010) (finding allegation that defendant took several adverse employment actions “in
retaliation” for plaintiff’s protected conduct were conclusory). For cases treating such allegations as
factual, see, for example, Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10-1122, 2010 WL 2977297, at *2–4 (7th Cir.
July 30, 2010) (allegation of lending discrimination sufficient where plaintiff alleged the kind of
discrimination, by whom, and when); P.W. v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:09cv480, 2009 WL 5215397,
at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2009) (finding allegation of disability discrimination sufficient where plaintiff
alleges that he is a “handicapped person who has a mental impairment which substantially limits his life
activities” and who was “denied” a “meaningful educational benefit.”); Riley v. Vilsack, 665 F. Supp. 2d
994 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (finding plaintiff’s allegations of age discrimination survive because they are
“more than conclusions,” in that plaintiff alleges that “defendants targeted for outsourcing the job
responsibilities of older workers while making comments about their preference for younger workers”).
85. See, e.g., Jones v. Hashagen, No. 4:09-CV-887, 2010 WL 128316, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2010)
(finding plaintiff’s allegation that the superintendent’s “failure to take action to curb Inmate Mitchell’s
pattern of assaults, known or should have been known to [him], [and] constituted deliberate
indifference” is conclusory); Milne v. Navigant Consulting, No. 08 Civ. 8964 (NRB), 2009 WL 4437412,
at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov 30, 2009) (finding retaliation claim implausible where no facts supported
allegation that defendant was aware that plaintiff intended to file Title VII claim); Choate v. Merrill,
No. 08-49-B-W, 2009 WL 3487768, at *6 (D. Me. Oct. 20, 2009) (in Eighth Amendment case, finding
allegation of supervisor’s knowledge of and indifference to lack of adequate life-saving equipment and
training was conclusory).
86. See, e.g., Decker v. Borough of Hughestown, No. 3:09-cv-1463, 2009 WL 4406142, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. Nov. 25, 2009) (finding allegation that Defendants “knew or should have known of Plaintiff’s right
to express himself in such a manner” was sufficient to support failure to train claim in First Amendment
Monell case); Gioffre v. Cnty. of Bucks, No. 08-4232, 2009 WL 3617742, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2009)
(in § 1983 (Eighth Amendment) case, finding following allegations sufficient: plaintiff needed medical
examination upon admission; exam was not provided because of policies and practices of prison;
defendants had tolerated practice of denying care to preserve resources; and defendants were on
notice); Mallinckrodt Inc. v. E-Z-Em Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569–70 (D. Del. 2009) (in patent case,
finding the plaintiff satisfied the pleading standard for an infringement claim by alleging that defendant
“became aware” of patent “shortly after” its issuance and that defendants “actively induced” infringing
acts).
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discrimination plaintiffs must make some factual allegation about similarly
situated individuals who were treated more favorably in order to state a claim
87
for disparate treatment. But a significant number of courts have rejected
heightened fact pleading in the discrimination context. Courts have seemed to
approach requiring detailed fact pleading in some other civil rights cases as well.
For instance, where a complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleged
that a Mayor participated in and executed raids in which household pets were
confiscated and killed in violation of plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the First Circuit treated that allegation as conclusory and
88
not credited. And in a school disciplinary case, the Second Circuit held that an
allegation that defendants were “not impartial” was conclusory without more
89
detail. The Second Circuit has contemporaneously suggested that Iqbal’s
requirement of factual detail was a limited one, in a case involving a claim
90
between businesses alleging negligent false statements. There are numerous
other cases in which lower courts have treated Iqbal as establishing a factdetailed pleading system, in arguable contrast to the notice pleading system
91
which prevailed pre-Twombly.
87. See Jenkins v. Murray, 352 F. App’x 608, 611 (3d Cir. 2009) (same for equal protection claim);
McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 532 (3d Cir. 2009) (same for First Amendment religion claim);
see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that discrimination claim was
implausible where one of plaintiffs was white and complained of exact same treatment as black
plaintiffs); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing First Amendment
claim where allegations did not support inference of disparate treatment of similarly situated groups);
Hughes v. Am.’s Collectibles Network, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-176, 2010 WL 890982, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
March 8, 2010) (in age-discrimination claim, plaintiff’s allegation that she was in “protected class” and
that replacement employee was not is insufficient—plaintiff did not allege what her age is and did not
allege anything to support a “pattern” of discrimination); Lopez v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist.,
668 F. Supp. 2d 406, 414–15 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding statutory discrimination claim conclusory in the
absence of any allegations of different treatment of similarly situated individuals); Kasten v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (finding age
discrimination complaint implausible because plaintiff did not provide age of replacement employee).
But see Kubicek v. Westchester Cnty., No. 08-CV-372 (KMK), 2009 WL 3720155, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
8, 2009) (finding employment discrimination complaint sufficient despite failure to identify person who
was hired to position to which plaintiff applied, other than that person was African-American “and/or”
younger than plaintiff, and despite failure to identify who made discirmninatory hiring decisions).
88. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009).
89. Holmes v. Poskanzer, 342 F. App’x 651, 653 (2d Cir. 2009).
90. Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 347 F. App’x 617, 622 (2d Cir. 2009)
(suggesting that plaintiff would not have to pinpoint exactly when defendant knew what facts, but
simply allege that defendant knew material facts before a critical date).
91. E.g., Lopez v. Beard, 333 F. App’x 685, 687 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming district court
dismissal of claim based on HIV status discrimination for lack of detail); Coleman v. Tulsa Cnty. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 08-CV-0081-CVE-FHM, 2009 WL 2513520, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2009)
(stating that claim might have survived under Conley standard; plaintiff alleged that she was sole
female employee in her department and that she was subjected to offensive and insulting remarks
based upon her gender); Dorsey v. Ga. Dep’t of State Rd. & Tollway Auth., No. 1:09-CV-1182-TWT,
2009 WL 247756, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2009) (finding allegations of “numerous” racially disparaging
remarks insufficient to state hostile work environment claim without greater detail establishing that
remarks were severe enough to alter the conditions of employment); Carrea v. California, No. EDCV
07-1148-CAS (MAN), 2009 WL 1770130, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009) (finding equal protection claim
dismissed because, although plaintiff alleged that no white prisoner was ever treated the same as the
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Many courts also have taken Iqbal’s conclusory analysis beyond states of
mind allegations. Some courts have held that it is not enough to allege the
existence of a contract, for instance, without setting forth the details that
92
establish the formation of a contract. In a patent infringement action, alleging
that a product “reproduces the novel distinctive design appearance” of the
plaintiff’s products without saying something specific about how the product
93
infringes was considered insufficient. Alleging that a defendant cursed at a
plaintiff was found to be insufficient to establish emotional distress necessary
for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim without some allegation
94
as to how the defendant caused emotional distress.
There are counter-examples. In a recent case from the Seventh Circuit, the
court found that an allegation of lending discrimination was sufficient where the
plaintiff’s complaint identified “the type of discrimination that she thinks occurs
(racial), by whom [the bank, through its manager and outside appraisers], and
when (in connection with her effort in early 2009 to obtain a home-equity
95
loan).” In a case from the Southern District of Indiana, a court found that an
allegation that the defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to serious medical
needs was conclusory, but the court in the same case found factual the
allegations that the defendant had “knowledge of the substandard medical care
provided to inmates” but “remained indifferent to the medical needs of inmates
96
at the facility.” In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a district court focused
on the notice provided by the complaint and upheld a supervisory liability claim
that alleged that defendants had “established, tolerated or ratified a practice,
custom or policy of failing to provide necessary medical care to inmates”
97
because of the costs imposed by such medical care. The court did so even
though the complaint “lack[ed] much detail,” did not “identify the precise
policy or practice instituted by Defendants,” and was only “barely” more than
98
“a blanket, general assertion of entitlement to relief.”
Overall, then, the lower courts are still feeling out the boundaries of the
term “conclusory” as it was used in Iqbal. One might hope that matters will
become clearer as appellate courts sift through lower court decisions, but it is
important to note that many of these decisions are context- and fact-specific,
and therefore admit of few generalizations. The Court’s abandonment of the
principles that informed the Federal Rules, combined with the absence of any

plaintiff, there were no factual allegations regarding housing, medical care, conditions of segregation or
other treatment of white prisoners).
92. See, e.g., Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2009).
93. Colida v. Nokia, Inc., 347 F. App’x 568, 570 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
94. Destro v. Hackensack Water Co., No. 08-04776 (SRC), 2009 WL 3681903, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 2,
2009).
95. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405–06 (7th Cir. 2010).
96. Estate of Allen ex rel. Wrightsmann v. CCA of Tenn., LLC, No. 1:08-cv-0774-SEB-TAB, 2009
WL 2091002, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2009)
97. Gioffre v. Cnty. of Bucks, No. 08-4232, 2009 WL 3617742, at *3, *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2009).
98. Id. at *4.
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guiding framework to replace them, threatens to leave pleading in an extended
state of confusion.
B. Lower Court Treatment of Plausibility
When a court considers the plausibility of a plaintiff’s claim for relief vis-àvis other alternative plausible explanations, a key issue is implied in the
analysis: the comparative level of plausibility of the plaintiff’s theory versus
alternative explanatory theories. If the plaintiff’s theory must be more plausible
than the alternative lawful explanations, then there are substantially different
consequences than if the alternative lawful explanations have to be significantly
more plausible than the plaintiff’s theory. The Supreme Court did not resolve
this question, other than to suggest, as it did in Twombly, that the alternative
explanation must be “obvious” in order for the plaintiff’s claim to be
99
implausible.
Courts have taken varying approaches to plausibility analysis. Some have
insisted that any alternative explanation from the defendant must be much
more obvious than the plaintiff’s theory of relief to render a claim
100
“implausible.” Some have simply insisted that the defendant’s explanation be
101
more plausible than the plaintiff’s. For instance, a court has found that rather
than believe that a warden transferred a prisoner because of deliberate
indifference to contagious diseases, it was “more likely” that the warden relied
102
on the advice of competent professionals and was not deliberately indifferent.
Similarly, a court hearing a retaliation claim filed by a prisoner found it “more
likely” that the prisoner was transferred to segregation for his own safety and
103
not because of retaliation for his complaints. Finally, some courts have failed
to address the quantum of plausibility at all, while suggesting that it is a high
104
hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.
99. 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007).
100. See Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding plaintiff can state a claim
where “reasonable minds can differ” about whether particular conduct violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)); Destro v. Hackensack Water Co., No. 08-04776 (SRC), 2009 WL
3681903, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2009) (finding plaintiff’s claim plausible where there “could” be a
violation of duty of fair representation); Ark. PERS v. GT Solar Int’l, Inc., No. 08–cv–312–JL, 2009 WL
3255225, at *4 (D.N.H. Oct. 7, 2009) (finding defendant’s alternative explanation does not render
plaintiff’s complaint implausible because defendant’s explanation is not “obvious”); Chao v. Ballista,
630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009) (stating defendant’s explanation has to be “so overwhelming,
that the claims no longer appear plausible”).
101. See In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 908–10 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding
where defendants’ explanation is “just as likely” as plaintiffs’ explanation, plaintiffs’ claim is
implausible); Blanchard v. Yates, No. CV 1-06-1841-NVW, 2009 WL 2460761, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 27,
2009); Phillips v. Bell, 365 F. App’x 133, 141–42 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding complaint implausible because
“more plausible” reasons exist for alleged conduct).
102. Blanchard, 2009 WL 2460761, at *3.
103. Lacy v. Tyson, No. CV 1-07-0381-JMR, 2009 WL 2777026, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009).
104. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 262 (4th Cir. 2009) (in
dissent, characterizing the majority as applying an incorrect “rule that the existence of any other
plausible explanation that points away from liability bars the claim”); Errivares v. Transp. Sec. Admin.,
No. DKC 09-1138, 2010 WL 610774, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 17, 2010) (finding allegation of conversion is
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Along with determining the quantum of plausibility, lower courts have had
to take up the Supreme Court’s invitation to use their “judicial experience and
common sense” to mediate the plausibility analysis. In the Southern District of
New York, for example, a court dismissed a § 1983 claim against the City of
New York that had alleged that a Fourth Amendment violation was the result
of an unwritten City policy, finding it more plausible to believe that the officer
105
who carried out the search “was a rogue officer who disobeyed City policy.”
In a suit against a Tennessee County under a “class of one” theory of equal
protection, the Court found an “obvious alternative explanation” for the
differential treatment of plaintiffs was that the defendants “made a mistake in
106
applying the law,” not that they singled out plaintiffs for pernicious reasons.
Arguably, courts could also rely on their experience and common sense to
amplify a plaintiff’s pleadings by taking notice of some particularly well107
recognized problems.
108
The case of King v. United Way of Central Carolinas, Inc. provides a nice
framework for understanding the significance of both conclusoriness and
plausibility together. In King, the plaintiff, an African-American woman,
alleged that she had been terminated because of her race, gender, and age. The
magistrate judge recommended that her discrimination claim be dismissed
because he found that her allegations of termination “because of”
109
discrimination were conclusory, relying on Iqbal. The court stated that it
would not draw an inference of discrimination from her factual allegations that
the committee that terminated her was composed entirely of men and that the
110
person who replaced her was a white man. Instead of crediting the plaintiff’s
allegation that she was terminated in part because of community discomfort
with an African-American woman receiving high compensation, the magistrate
judge found it more plausible to believe that the plaintiff was terminated
because of the public reaction to the disclosure of her high compensation and
not plausible where facts show only that defendant’s employee “could have acted wrongfully”). But see
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 597 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Just as a plaintiff cannot proceed if
his allegations are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, so a defendant is not entitled to
dismissal if the facts are merely consistent with lawful conduct.”); Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949,
977 (9th Cir. 2009) (claims are plausible so long as they are not unreasonable); U.S. ex rel. Lusby v.
Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2009) (clarifying that pleading need not exclude all
alternative possibilities to be plausible).
105. 5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 268, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
106. Arnold v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:09cv0163, 2009 WL 2430822, at
*5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2009); see also Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., No. 3:09cv0163, 2009 WL
4508581 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2009) (finding allegation that defendants were part of RICO enterprise was
conclusory, in part based on the court’s “common experience”).
107. See, e.g., Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (D. Mass. 2009) (taking notice of public
attention devoted to abuse in prisons to support conclusion that the facts alleged in the complaint
raised plausible inference of deliberate indifference to risk of sexual abuse in prison).
108. No. 3:09CV164-MR-DSC, 2009 WL 2432706 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2009), report and
recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part by King v. United Way of Cent. Carolinas, Inc., No.
3:09cv164, 2010 WL 1958128 (W.D.N.C. May, 14, 2010).
109. Id. at *9.
110. Id.
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that the person who replaced her replaced her not because of race but because
111
he “is a respected local figure.” In other words, the magistrate judge accepted
the plaintiff’s allegation that she was terminated because the community was
uncomfortable with her high salary, but did not believe that the discomfort was
related to her being a black woman.
The report and recommendation of dismissal was ultimately rejected by the
district court, however, because the district court found that the plaintiff’s
allegations were sufficient to state a claim of discrimination under the
112
Swierkiewicz test. In so doing the district court focused solely on the plaintiff’s
allegations that she was a member of a protected class, that she was qualified
and performed well, and that she was terminated and replaced by a white
113
man. The district court appeared not to consider any alternative explanations
offered for the adverse employment action, at least to the extent that they were
found outside of the four corners of the complaint. While the magistrate judge’s
conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims were implausible seemed to rest on
assessment of the strength of the evidence supporting the claim of
discrimination, the district court judge appeared to be loathe to look beyond the
plaintiff’s complaint to assess plausibility. Both the district judge and the
magistrate applied Iqbal to the pleadings, but they differed in their
understanding of both conclusoriness and plausibility.
C. The Evidentiary Nature of Pleading After Iqbal and Twombly
Although it is impossible to entirely rationalize lower court application of
Iqbal and Twombly, it is clear that many courts have adopted something akin to
an evidence-based standard for pleading in the wake of the two decisions,
modified in some cases by differing presumptions about information
114
availability. Thus, for some courts considering whether an allegation is
conclusory or factual, the extent to which the allegation resembles an
evidentiary submission appears to play a role. For example, some courts ask
whether the allegation states the who, the what, the where, the when, etc.—an
inquiry more suited to heightened pleading under Rule 9(b). And similarly,
when considering whether a particular claim for relief is plausible, some lower
courts appear to be asking themselves whether or not they find the claim
115
believable, especially as compared to other possible scenarios. At the same
time, some courts depart from an evidentiary approach by forgiving thin
pleadings when the plaintiff is at an asymmetrical informational disadvantage
111. Id.
112. King v. United Way of Cent. Carolinas, Inc., No. 3:09cv164, 2010 WL 1958128, at *5
(W.D.N.C. May 14, 2010) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002)).
113. Id.
114. In the wake of Iqbal and Twombly, Adam Steinman has criticized an “evidentiary approach”
to pleading in which courts require a complaint to contain evidentiary support for each allegation.
Steinman, supra note 7, at 1328–33. He distinguishes such an approach from courts that require detailed
allegations about specific issues. Id. at 1343–44, although he finds both objectionable.
115. See supra notes 100–104.
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compared to the defendant.
Consider an example of two cases from the Third Circuit that seem to be in
conflict: two claims of employment discrimination in which the appellate court
117
came to opposite conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the allegations. To
some extent, however, these different outcomes can be explained as a function
of informational asymmetry. In the case in which the Third Circuit was lenient
toward thin pleadings, the key allegation related to the defendant’s state of
118
mind. In the case where the plaintiff was given less leeway, the key allegations
related to what kind of conduct the plaintiff alleged was harassing or retaliatory,
what kinds of promotional opportunities were denied to the plaintiff, what kind
of adverse employment actions she suffered, and what “specific” actions of
119
racial animus were taken against her. Allegations as to these facts are clearly
more within the realm of information possessed by the plaintiff as compared
with allegations of the defendant’s state of mind. Thus, one can see how the
evidentiary framework suggested by Iqbal and Twombly might function
differently in these two cases, based on the presumed availability of particular
kinds of information at the pleading stage.
The Third Circuit also has appeared to accept conclusory allegations of state
of mind in other arenas. In the context of tortious interference with contractual
relations, the Third Circuit has accepted as factual an allegation that a
defendant “engaged in a course of action and communications to the
Commissioner of the Virgin Islands Department of Planning and Natural
Resources” that “was designed and calculated to delay and interfere with” a
120
particular construction project. And to the extent that plaintiffs make
allegations based on specific interactions with defendants, the Third Circuit
seems more willing to find such allegations factual and sufficient to state claims
121
that rely on a defendant’s state of mind. In other words, where a court thinks
116. E.g., Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 473 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (ordering discovery
where “key facts are unknown” and solely within defendant’s possession); Connolly v. Smugglers’
Notch Mgmt. Co., No. 2:09-CV-131, 2009 WL 3734123, at *2–3 (D. Vt. Nov. 5, 2009) (finding it was not
necessary for FLSA plaintiff to allege specific time periods when she worked overtime, given
informational asymmetry); Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (not
requiring that plaintiff make separate allegations as to each defendant where plaintiff was not in room
where defendants executed search).
117. Compare Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2009), with Holmes v.
Gates, 342 F. App’x 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2010).
118. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 212.
119. Holmes, 342 F. App’x at 653.
120. Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 834 (3d Cir. 2011). But see Culinary Serv. of
Del. Valley, Inc. v. Borough of Yardley, 385 F. App’x 135, 143 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding dismissal of
tortious interference claim is proper where plaintiffs “make bare assertions that [defendant] acted
willfully to bring about the termination of the Agreement”).
121. Matthews v. Villella, 381 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding allegation of malicious use
of force sufficient where plaintiff alleged use of force while plaintiff was handcuffed and not offering
any resistance); Flood v. Schaefer, 367 F. App’x 315, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding allegation of excessive
force during arrest plausible where plaintiff alleged that officers were aware of his severe back injury
and handcuffed him in a manner that would cause excessive pain); Merritt v. Fogel, 349 F. App’x 742,
746–47 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding allegations based on specific interactions with medical staff
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that it is more plausible that a plaintiff has knowledge of an allegation, it is
more likely to consider that allegation factual.
Many other appellate courts have drawn similar lines, being less likely to
find allegations factual and claims plausible when the plaintiff has omitted facts
from her complaint to which one would expect her to have access. In one
takings case, for instance, the Fourth Circuit applied a relatively lenient
pleading standard, finding a plausible claim for relief based on allegedly
122
“inequitable and illegitimate” governmental conduct. In a procedural due
process case, on the other hand, the same circuit held that an allegation that a
student “was not afforded notice or a hearing prior to his removal from the
[academic] program” was conclusory because it stated an element of the cause
123
of action.
The Fifth Circuit also has been more willing to credit allegations that appear
124
to stem from the direct knowledge of the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff’s allegation
that he was subjected to an “arrest” and “interrogation” was conclusory, but his
allegations regarding exactly what was said to him by various police officers
125
were factual. The Fifth Circuit, like many other circuits, also has held that
limited discovery may be appropriate where the plaintiff suffers from
126
informational asymmetry with respect to essential elements of his claim.
127
128
129
One can see similar lines drawn in the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
sufficient to establish claim for deliberate indifference).
122. Acorn Land, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty., 402 F. App’x 809, 817 (4th Cir. 2010).
123. Brown v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 361 F. App’x 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2010).
124. Giardina v. Lawrence, 354 F. App’x 914, 915 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding allegations sufficient to
allege excessive force claim where plaintiff alleged that he was shot by a National Guardsman and
arrested for aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm, even though no firearm found on
him); Gonzalez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 344 F. App’x 984, 986 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that district court
erred by disregarding plaintiff’s allegations about the frequency of meals in prison).
125. Rhodes v. Prince, 360 F. App’x 555, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2010). Rhodes is a strange decision in at
least one way: it holds that the factual allegations made by the plaintiff did not support a finding that he
was arrested, in part because he did not allege that he subjectively felt that he was not free to leave. Id.
But the Fourth Amendment is indifferent to the subjective perceptions of a plaintiff—what is relevant
is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances.
126. See Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In a case
stemming from alleged misconduct by police officers in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the court
recognized that there “may be no supportive evidence” for the plaintiff’s claim, but his allegations
regarding the defendant’s state of mind “is the type of conflict that warrants discovery.” Floyd v. City of
Kenner, 351 F. App’x 890, 895 (5th Cir. 2009). At the same time, the court found conclusory an
allegation that a defendant “participated in, approved and directed” particular misconduct. Id. at 898.
This allegation lacked any detail and therefore could not support the plaintiff’s allegations.
127. See Wright v. Leis, 335 F. App’x 552, 555 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 384 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding excessive force sufficiently pleaded where plaintiff essentially alleged
that he posed no security threat at the time force was used against him, thus creating an inference that
the use of force was unnecessary and motivated by malice); Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
374 F. App’x 612, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding allegations sufficient to state Eighth Amendment
claim where “Plaintiff has further alleged that Defendants ‘ignored and mocked’ the threats of suicide
Plaintiff received from his wife, from which it seems plausible that Plaintiff could prove the subjective
prong of deliberate indifference”).
128. Compare Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1185–86 (10th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that prisoners do
not suffer from informational asymmetry because of grievance system), with Arocho v. Nafziger, 367 F.
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Circuits as well. In the First and Second Circuits, courts have been more
ambivalent about abandoning notice pleading even when the plaintiff can be
said to be at no informational disadvantage. Cases within these circuits have,
however, expressed significant concern about heightening pleading when there
132
is profound informational asymmetry.
App’x 942, 953–55 (10th Cir. 2010) (expressing concern that defendants can take advantage of
informational asymmetry; allegation that clinic director was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s
Hepatitis C was “thin,” but sufficient, in part because the relative responsibility of the clinic director
depended in large part on the responsibility of the Bureau of Prisons director).
129. See Jemison v. Mitchell, 380 F. App’x 904, 906–07 (11th Cir. 2010) (in a prisoner claim alleging
retaliation, finding claim sufficient where plaintiff alleged that officer filed false disciplinary report
seven days after prisoner filed lawsuit); Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 763–64, 766–67 (11th
Cir. 2010) (in a First and Fourth Amendment claim brought against supervisory officials in the Miami
Police Department, the court found the claim to be sufficiently pleaded where there were ample
allegations of the defendants’ personal involvement in abusive police tactics); Edwards v. Fulton Cnty.,
363 F. App’x 717, 718 (11th Cir. 2010) (in an equal protection case, the court found a complaint
sufficient where it alleged that a defendant “personally made the decision to continue discriminatory
pay practices after these practices were repeatedly brought to his attention”; the court took this
allegation as true, because the complaint alleged that the defendant disregarded memoranda notifying
him of pay discrepancies and instead continued the discrimination).
130. On one hand the First Circuit has rejected a district court opinion that had asked for the
pleading of specific facts as to causation. Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29–
30 (1st Cir. 2010) (Souter, J., sitting by designation). In so doing the court explicitly rejected an
evidentiary standard for plausibility and conclusoriness. Id. at 30 (“A plausible but inconclusive
inference from pleaded facts will survive a motion to dismiss.”). The same circuit, however, found
particular allegations insufficient because they lacked factual detail that could rebut the alternatives
offered by the defendants. United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Int’l Union v.
Fortuno, 633 F.3d 37, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2011); see also In re Karagianis, No. 08–13704–JMD, 2009 WL
4738188, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.H. Dec. 4, 2009) (“[W]hile Iqbal does not require a plaintiff’s complaint to
weave an eloquent narrative fit for a novel, the new standard at least requires some intelligible,
factually-developed context to support the legal elements of the cause of action.”); Cortelco Sys. of
P.R., Inc. v. Phoneworks, Inc., No. 09-1371CCC, 2009 WL 4046794, at *3 (D.P.R. Nov. 20, 2009) (in
antitrust action, finding allegations that plaintiff “has been injured in business and property by the
defendants’ conspiracy” to be conclusory, and other allegations regarding defendant’s criminal history,
alter ego status, and defendant’s intent to create a monopoly are “nothing more than conjecture,
irrelevant statements or unsupported conclusions of law”).
131. See Shomo v. State of N.Y., 374 F. App’x 180, 183 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Finally, Appellant’s
complaint arguably gave the State ‘fair notice’ of his Eighth Amendment, ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims, allowing it to engage in motion practice or prepare for trial by reviewing Appellant’s medical
history, medical needs, and the care provided to him.”); see also Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592
F.3d 314, 323–25 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 901 (2011) (distinguishing Twombly and finding
allegation of agreement in antitrust action sufficient because of numerous subsidiary factual allegations;
also making clear that at the pleading stage plaintiffs do not have to allege facts that exclude
defendants’ independent self-interest as an explanation for parallel behavior; also making clear that
plaintiffs do not have to “identify the specific time, place, or person related to each conspiracy
allegation”); Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’n, Inc., 347 F. App’x 617, 619–20 (2d Cir. 2009)
(although finding that complaint was properly dismissed, rejecting the district court’s suggestion that
plaintiff would have to allege specific facts of exactly what defendant knew and when; stating it would
instead suffice to allege general knowledge of a problem before a critical date).
132. See, e.g., Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (where there is
informational asymmetry that favors the defendant, the plaintiff is permitted to allege facts based on
information and belief); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 692–93 (2d Cir.
2009), cert. denied, Ferring B.V. v. Meijer, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3505 (2010) (expressing resistance to
dismissing claim at pleading stage where issue revolved around scienter; even if pleadings on their face
could not establish liability for factfinder, “the plaintiffs’ pleadings could plausibly lead to additional
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In sum, Iqbal and Twombly have created a raft of confusion among lower
courts. Courts are not sure how to decide what is a conclusory allegation or how
133
likely a claim for relief must be in order to qualify as plausible. To some
extent, however, courts have agreed that the presence of informational
asymmetry should mitigate the harshness of the rules from Iqbal and Twombly,
but few courts have tried to explain why that should be so.
IV
SOURCES OF CONFUSION
The lower courts’ treatment of Iqbal is hardly a model of consistency. In
some ways, this is a reflection of the opinion itself, which never articulates
precisely what is meant by “conclusory” and to a lesser extent, “plausibility.”
Indeed, the decision’s treatment of some of the plaintiff’s allegations as factual
134
and others as conclusory is particularly difficult to resolve. In addition, to the
extent that Iqbal announces a new pleading standard, it is to be expected that
there will be difficulty adjusting, given the well-established Conley standard that
governed pleading in the federal courts for several decades.
Nonetheless, another distinct reason that interpreting Iqbal has posed
significant difficulty is because the Court has, without clear acknowledgment,
abandoned the historical understanding of the words “conclusory” and
“plausible.” Thus, it is not simply that the Court has ushered in a new pleading
regime, but that the Court has done so without coming up with a new way of
describing what purpose pleading is serving.
Let us start with the word “conclusory.” If one looks at the use of the word
in Supreme Court opinions prior to Iqbal and Twombly, one must draw two
critical conclusions. First, prior to Twombly the Court generally reserved use of
the term for those cases in which something other than the sufficiency of a
pleading was at issue: summary judgment, standing, discovery, and criminal
procedure. Second, and relatedly, when the Court had previously used the term,
it distinguished between factual statements and conclusory assertions not at the

findings that would satisfy” the standard for liability at trial); Brenes-Laroche v. Toledo Davila, 682 F.
Supp. 2d 179, 187 (D.P.R. 2010) (noting and accounting for presence of informational asymmetry); cf.
Corona Realty Holding, LLC v. Town of N. Hempstead, 382 F. App’x 70, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding
conclusory, in takings action, allegation that landmark designation caused the “value of the plaintiffs’
property to be diminished, loss of income, the plaintiff to incur substantial legal fees; and to be
otherwise damaged; and was all done to benefit the homeowners and the Town of North Hempstead
and not for any legitimate reason”).
133. The cost of this confusion may depend on the ability of pleaders to use the liberal amendment
policies of the Federal Rules, see FED. R. CIV. P. 15, to cure pleading defects. There is some indication,
for instance, that after Iqbal, judges are more likely to grant motions to dismiss without prejudice, thus
preserving a litigant’s ability to pursue amendment. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 13. But it
remains to be seen whether litigants will actually be able to take advantage of the amendment process,
particularly where they are asked to plead facts that can only be gleaned from information that cannot
be obtained without discovery.
134. In particular, Iqbal treats paragraph 69 of the complaint as factual and paragraph 96 as
conclusory, but it is difficult to discern the structural difference between the two paragraphs.
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pleading stage, but at later procedural stages in which evidence was to be
presented. Because pleading had not, since the advent of the Federal Rules,
involved an assessment of the quality of a party’s evidence, the word
“conclusory” had meant little at the pleading stage. The most that can be said of
the term at the pleading stage was that it was primarily used to describe entirely
legal assertions. At the pleading stage, consistent with the intent of the drafters
of the Federal Rules, the Court had declined to parse whether a factual
allegation was “conclusory” or not. This can be shown by reviewing opinions
from a number of different areas of the law.
In summary judgment opinions, for example, the Court has consistently
135
maintained that “conclusory” statements in affidavits were to be disregarded.
For instance, in Doe v. Chao, in a dispute regarding whether claims under the
Privacy Act required proof of actual damages, the Court referred to one of the
claimant’s “conclusory allegations” regarding the damages he suffered as the
136
result of disclosure of his Social Security number. At the summary judgment
stage, the Court found that these statements were insufficient to establish an
137
entitlement to actual damages.
This point is amplified when one examines some of the Court’s seminal
standing cases, in which it took up the adequacy of certain plaintiffs’ proof of
actual injury at the summary judgment stage. In Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, for example, the Court had to determine whether affidavits
submitted at the summary judgment stage raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether members of the National Wildlife Foundation actually were aggrieved
138
by particular agency action. The Court did so by examining in detail the
139
particular facts alleged in each of two affidavits. The appellate court had
interpreted the affidavits as presenting ambiguous evidence as to the injury
suffered by the members, and had found that at summary judgment it could not
140
read that ambiguity against them as the non-moving party. The Supreme
Court disagreed, noting that the appellate court had improperly permitted
“general averments” in the affidavit to suffice for the specific facts necessary to
141
resist summary judgment. Significantly, the Court emphasized that, while

135. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 617–18 (2004) (on summary judgment, referring to evidence of
emotional distress as “conclusory” because based only on plaintiff’s allegations that he was “torn . . . all
to pieces” and “greatly concerned and worried”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–84 (2000) (on summary judgment, distinguishing between affidavits and
testimony of members of Friends of the Earth, and those in Lujan which were “conclusory”); Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885–89 (1990).
136. 540 U.S. at 617–18.
137. Id. at 621–22. The lower court opinion makes clear that the claimant in question had submitted
an affidavit to support his claim of actual damages in the complaint. Doe v. Chao. 306 F.3d 170, 181–82
(4th Cir. 2002). Thus, both the lower court and the Supreme Court viewed the problem in terms of
evidentiary sufficiency. Id.
138. 497 U.S. 871, 885–89 (1990).
139. Id. at 887–88.
140. Id. at 888.
141. Id.
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general allegations might suffice at the complaint stage, the purpose of Rule 56
“is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with
142
conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”
The Lujan Court’s implicit suggestion that conclusory allegations—which it
143
seemed to equate with “general allegations” —are permissible at the
complaint stage is only reinforced by the Court’s distinguishing its earlier
decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
144
(SCRAP). The SCRAP case, also involving standing, was decided at the
145
motion to dismiss stage, the Lujan Court pointed out. In SCRAP, the
defendants challenged standing, arguing that the plaintiffs’ allegations of injury
146
were “vague, unsubstantiated, and insufficient.”
The Court disagreed,
emphasizing the motion to dismiss standard and noting that “[w]e cannot say on
147
these pleadings that the appellees could not prove their allegations.” As the
Lujan Court interpreted it, SCRAP’s acceptance of vague and general
allegations of injury to support standing was acceptable at the Rule 12 stage
because there, unlike summary judgment, “general allegations embrace those
148
specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”
The Lujan Court’s distinction between the conclusory allegations acceptable
at the motion to dismiss stage and those unacceptable at the summary judgment
stage was renewed even more recently in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
149
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. FOE, like Lujan, was decided at
summary judgment, but unlike Lujan the Court found that injury in fact had
150
been adequately supported. Focusing on testimony provided in affidavits and
at deposition, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence from
which to conclude that “Laidlaw’s discharges, and the affiant members’
reasonable concerns about the effects of those discharges, directly affected
151
those affiants’ recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests.” The affidavits
and testimony offered by the plaintiffs in FOE, in contrast to that presented to
the Court in Lujan, provided more than “mere general averments and
152
conclusory allegations.”
The line that the Court has drawn in summary judgment cases is similar to
that drawn in other contexts in which evidentiary standards, rather than
pleading rules, are in play. In the discovery context, for instance, where “good
cause” is sometimes required to justify particularly invasive examinations, the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 889.
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
497 U.S. at 889.
412 U.S. at 683–84.
Id. at 689–90.
497 U.S. at 889 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
528 U.S. 167, 181–84 (2000).
Id. at 183.
Id. at 183–84.
Id. at 184.
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Court has drawn the same line between “conclusory” allegations being
permissible at the complaint stage but not as a substitute for evidentiary
sufficiency. One example is Schlagenhauf v. Holder, in which the negligence of a
153
Greyhound bus driver was relevant to claims between several parties. One of
the parties being sued by Greyhound for damages caused in an accident
asserted as part of its answer that the bus driver was not mentally or physically
able to drive when the accident occurred, and then petitioned for an order to
154
have the driver examined by several physicians. Pursuant to Rule 35, such an
155
order could only be made on a showing of “good cause.” Significantly, the
Supreme Court agreed with lower federal courts that had treated “good cause”
as more than a “mere formality,” something that could not be met “by mere
conclusory allegations of the pleadings,” but instead required an affirmative
156
evidentiary showing. While the Court declined to require a showing on the
merits of the movant’s case, it did require “sufficient information, by whatever
means, so that the district judge can fulfill his function mandated by the
157
Rule.”
One can even look outside the context of civil procedure or standing to
observe that, at least prior to Iqbal and Twombly, the Court has historically
treated “conclusory” as a derogative only in those instances where some
evidentiary showing was at stake. Thus, in the context of criminal procedure,
the Court has held that the “conclusory allegations” of both police officers and
informants are insufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to support
158
issuance of an arrest or search warrant. And in the habeas corpus context, the
Court made clear that the presence of “conclusory[] or palpably incredible”
allegations in a habeas petition does not relieve a court of the power to
investigate them, but it does permit district courts to decline to require the
159
presence of a habeas petitioner at an evidentiary hearing. In contrast,
allegations that are “improbable” but not “incredible” and that if true would
160
justify relief are sufficient to justify an evidentiary habeas hearing. Relatedly,
in the immigration context, the Court has found that conclusory allegations are
insufficient to meet a particular statute’s requirements of an evidentiary
161
showing of extreme hardship.
The significance of the “conclusory” label for evidentiary showings is
153. 379 U.S. 104, 107 (1964).
154. Id.
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(2)(A).
156. 379 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 119.
158. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 276–77 (1983).
159. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495–96 (1962).
160. Id. at 496; see also United States v. MacCollom 426 U.S. 317, 326–27 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(in habeas context, finding that in forma pauperis petitioner was not entitled to transcript because his
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were “conclusory” and “naked” of any factual
allegations—petitioner only said he had been denied effective assistance of counsel without any
additional elaboration).
161. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 141–43 (1981).
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confirmed by the Court’s procedural due process jurisprudence as well. In some
of the seminal pre-judgment attachment and seizure cases—North Georgia
162
163
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. and Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., for
instance—a critical issue was the sufficiency of the affidavit that had to be filed
by the creditor seeking attachment or seizure of particular property. In both of
these cases, the Court rested its holding as to the sufficiency of pre-judgment
procedures on whether they permitted the seizures to be based on “conclusory”
164
affidavits. Thus, although conclusory allegations were sufficient at the
complaint stage, more than conclusory assertions have historically only been
necessary when a court is being asked to take action implying some evidentiary
showing or finding.
That “conclusory” factual assertions were considered sufficient at the
pleading stage, at least prior to Twombly and Iqbal, is further evidenced by
pleading cases themselves. To the extent that the Court discussed the word
“conclusory” in the context of pleadings, it was always with the understanding
that conclusory allegations would suffice at the pleading stage. Thus, in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., the defendant had argued that finding plaintiff’s
complaint sufficient would “allow[] lawsuits based on conclusory allegations of
165
discrimination to go forward,” imposing a burden on courts and employers.
The Court’s response was telling: it did not deny that its ruling permitted
complaints with conclusory allegations to survive dismissal, but instead noted
166
that Rule 8(a) can only be changed by amending federal rules or by Congress.
And in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Court found a
discrimination complaint sufficiently pleaded although it was “more conclusory
167
and abbreviated than good pleading would suggest.”
Finally, the premise that conclusory factual allegations were sufficient at the
pleading stage can also be seen in many of the separate concurring and
dissenting opinions filed in particular cases. For instance, the occasional Justice
criticized the majority when it resolved constitutional questions on the
pleadings, precisely because the only information available was based on
“conclusory” allegations and not the factual evidence that would be developed
168
through a hearing. Indeed, the Court even had an understanding that it would
162. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
163. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
164. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 606–07 (noting that pre-judgment seizure procedures were insufficient
where statute only required “conclusory” allegations not based on any personal knowledge of the
facts); Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 605–06 (1974) (upholding pre-judgment attachment where affidavit is more
than merely conclusory).
165. 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002).
166. Id.
167. 441 U.S. 91, 124–26 (1979).
168. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 299 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting in part)
(criticizing Court for accepting “conclusory” allegations that unequal spending on school districts
created disparity); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 319 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that, although “conclusory allegations” are sufficient for procedural purposes
at the pleading stage, there should be an evidentiary requirement to justify an order relating to the
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be unfair in certain contexts to ask more of plaintiffs at the pleading stage
because of the informational asymmetry that is present in so many cases
169
challenging governmental conduct. But allegations that were deemed so
conclusory so as to be disregarded were true legal conclusions: they simply
stated the elements of a cause of action and no more, with no facts
170
whatsoever. In this light, an allegation was factual and non-conclusory so long
171
as it could be proven or disproven by historical facts.
One can go through the same exercise with “plausible,” which the Court in
Twombly and Iqbal says is something more than “possible” but less than
“probable.” Indeed, scholars already have reviewed the differences between the
meaning of the word “plausible” as it was used in summary judgment decisions
172
and as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal. But even outside of the summary
judgment context, the Court has never used the word “plausible” as it does in
Twombly and Iqbal. In fact, as a historical matter, a claim or theory was
“plausible” precisely when it was “conceivable” or “possible.” This is brought
to light most forcefully by considering equal protection challenges, in which the
Court has routinely treated “plausible” synonymously with “possible” or
173
“conceivable.” The Court has used the word in similar ways in the context of

constitutionality of a statute); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 32–33 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(objecting to resolution of constitutional question, whether indigent defendants are entitled to free
transcript of criminal proceedings for direct appeal, based solely on conclusory allegation of indigence).
169. See C. I. R. v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 624–30 (1976) (in Anti-Injunction Act proceeding
involving tax collection, holding that it was sufficient for taxpayer to allege in conclusory fashion that
there were not circumstances under which Government would prevail—the Court reasoned that where
Government has not provided a basis for its tax assessment, the taxpayer cannot plead any specific facts
because they reside with the Government).
170. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (finding “conclusory” allegations that
“petitioners ‘have engaged in and continue to engage in, a pattern and practice of conduct . . . all of
which has deprived and continues to deprive plaintiffs and members of their class of their’
constitutional rights and, again, that petitioners ‘have denied and continue to deny to plaintiffs and
members of their class their constitutional rights’ by illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury-fee
practices”); Black Unity League of Ky. v. Miller, 394 U.S. 100, 100–01 (1969) (per curiam) (terming
conclusory allegations of “harassment” by the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee; plaintiffs
failed to respond to motion to dismiss and Court held that “in this procedural context the trial court
could take appellants’ conclusory allegations as insubstantial and could dismiss the complaint for failure
to allege sufficient irreparable injury to justify federal intervention at this early stage”); W. E. B.
DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 310–13 (1967) (dismissing claim for injunctive relief where
Congress had provided procedures for challenging sanctions of the Subversive Activities Control Board
and where complaint only contained “no more than conclusory allegations that the purpose of the
threatened enforcement of the Act was to ‘harass’ appellants and that harassment was the intended
result of the Attorney General’s announcement that he had filed a petition with the SACB”); Schilling
v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 676–77 (1960) (holding allegation that administrative action was “arbitrary and
capricious” was conclusory).
171. Cf. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091–95 (1991) (in securities fraud action,
recognizing that “conclusory” statements about the value of a stock—alleged to be false and
misleading—are “factual” in the sense that they can be proven or disproven by historical facts).
172. Brunet, supra note 10, at 3–8.
173. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522, 528–29 (1959).
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174

habeas claims.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the Court is precluded from
using words differently at different times. Nor is it meant to suggest that the
Court is precluded from abandoning a prior meaning of a word in the same
context, as it may be doing here. But doing so without acknowledgment creates
the potential for substantial confusion, especially when the Court, as it has in
Twombly and Iqbal, insists that it is creating no new law or heightened
pleading.
V
PLEADING AS INFORMATION-FORCING
Even if the Court has departed from past pleading practice without
sufficient explanation or definition, lower courts nonetheless must strive to
discern some principle in the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Some lower courts
appear to have found guidance on the continuum between notice pleading and
something analogous to an information-forcing rule. Notice pleading rules focus
courts on the defendant’s perspective: they ask whether the pleading permits a
defendant to prepare a defense or a responsive pleading. Once a pleading
satisfies this minimum threshold, it will be sufficient even if the plaintiff could
provide more detail. Information-forcing pleading rules, in contrast, focus
courts on the plaintiff’s willingness and ability to provide additional detail
beyond that which provides adequate notice to the defendant. For courts,
information-forcing rules might serve as a proxy for the merits of a plaintiff’s
claim, a way of achieving fairness between the litigants, or promoting an
efficient resolution of the controversy. The question is whether there exists
sufficient justification for resolving pleading problems by reference to an
information-forcing principle, a question that neither Iqbal nor Twombly ever
addressed head-on.
Whatever our basis for believing that information-forcing is important—
efficiency, fairness, or accuracy—it is important to look to other informationforcing regimes to determine whether information-forcing in the pleading
context is a sensible change in doctrine. This is because, while notice pleading
“forced” some information from the plaintiff, Twombly and Iqbal arguably
force a whole lot more, and it is instructive to look to other contexts to
determine whether the increased compulsion is justifiable. Information-forcing
rules in the pleading context do not easily fit into traditional justifications. Their
efficiency depends in part on the nature of the information and whether there
are information asymmetries that are leveraged by the rule. There is little
evidence that they will promote better decisionmaking in the judicial context.
If one is to apply information-forcing principles in the pleading context, it

174. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 122–23 (1982) (equating plausible with “colorable” in a
habeas case); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 613–14 (1982) (referring to “plausible” claim that
defendant would have pursued a different strategy if he had received effective assistance of counsel).
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may make sense to limit its application with at least two requirements. The first
requirement is that the information be exclusively in the hands of the pleader.
This kind of limited information-forcing rule might at least place the incentive
to provide additional information on the proper party at the proper procedural
175
stage. Where the informational asymmetry favors the responding party, on the
other hand, there is little justification for applying an information-forcing
principle to the pleader. The second requirement is that there be a good reason
to impose an information-forcing rule at the pleading stage rather than at a later
stage in the proceedings. For instance, imagine where there is no informational
asymmetry in either direction—where both parties have equal access to
information. In that circumstance it is hard to justify forcing the plaintiff to
disclose the information prior to discovery, at the pleading stage. Even for
information squarely in the hands of the plaintiff, one still should ask whether
disclosure through pleading, as compared to disclosure through discovery, will
advance interests in fairness, efficiency, or accuracy.
A. A Loose Taxonomy of Information-Forcing
The classic justification for information-forcing rules, stemming from Ayres
176
and Gertner’s analysis of contract law, is that they provide an incentive for the
party with the best access to private information to disclose it to a contracting
party or third parties. Arguments for such rules have been extensive both within
177
and without contract theory, and have not been limited to privately-held
178
information. In the area of intellectual property some substantive rights are
mediated by rules that encourage the party with the best access to information

175. Under a notice–pleading regime, information asymmetry between the parties is generally
remedied through discovery, so it still bears consideration whether to change the procedural stage at
which courts attempt to create incentives to relieve informational asymmetry.
176. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95–100 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1623 (1989); see also Yair
Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 501–02 (2008) (discussing
information-forcing theories of contract law, prompted by Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341, 156
Eng. Rep. 145).
177. See John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for
Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1400–01 (2008) (discussing information-forcing rules in
the context of environmental regulation, all of which give incentive to manufacturers and other
regulated entities to provide privately-held information or information difficult for regulators to
acquire); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1188 (2008)
(discussing potential for information-forcing rules in context of use and disposition of genetic material);
Russell Korobkin, “No Compensation” or “Pro Compensation”: Moore v. Regents and Default Rules
for Human Tissue Donations, J. HEALTH L., Winter 2007, at 1, 17 (proposing information-forcing
default rule in tissue donation context).
178. Sean Williams, for instance, has urged that information-forcing rules be encouraged in
employment law, giving an employer the incentive to inform employees about the nature of at-will
employment, even though such information is not privately held. Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky
Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit
Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733, 779 (2009).
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to disclose privately held information. These information-forcing rules are
180
meant, among other things, to decrease transaction costs for third parties.
Arguments for information-forcing rules also have been made in the context
of regulation and preemption, with some academics and the Supreme Court
expressing concern about the effect that finding preemption will have on
181
industry incentive to provide relevant information to regulatory agencies.
There are important differences between contract law and command and
control regulation. Default rules that promote information-disclosure in
contract law might help fill gaps, but will not make or break contract formation
because parties will presumably contract around whatever the default rule is.
Command and control environmental regulation is more coercive and, through
information-forcing default rules, may force bargaining and negotiation that
182
would not otherwise occur.
In any event, these information-forcing rules are primarily about aligning
incentives to disclose information with the best ability to disclose. Their goal is
to reduce transaction costs by creating a legal regime in which the cheapest
discloser has the strongest incentive to do so. They do so by creating a penalty
default rule in which the party with the best and cheapest access to information
is penalized for failing to disclose it (or at least prohibited from taking
advantage of the informational asymmetry later on). These kinds of
information-forcing rules may have the most purchase in the pleading context.
As one becomes further removed from the area of contract law, it becomes
harder to speak of true information-forcing rules, but there are close analogs
which also may bear on the pleading question. Some of these analogs are not
179. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology:
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 506 (2008) (discussing
information-forcing aspect of disclosure doctrine in patent application); Christopher A. Cotropia,
Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 723, 753–62 (2009)
(discussing information-forcing aspects of patent law’s inequitable conduct doctrine—information is
forced from the party with the best access to information).
180. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 70–71
(2005) (discussing value of information-forcing rules in patent context—rules that create an incentive
for patent seekers to discover and disclose additional information prior to obtaining approval for a
patent application); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 194–209 (2002) (explaining the importance of using information-forcing
rules during patent examination to maintain the “integrity” of patent law’s links among “innovation,
disclosure, and patent scope”).
181. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202–03 nn.11–12 (2009) (rejecting preemption in
part because of role of state tort law in forcing information from manufacturers); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 519–
20 n.330 (2008) (arguing for information-forcing approach in preemption law that would encourage
regulated entities to provide regular and comprehensive information regarding product safety to the
FDA). For perspective on current role of information in environmental regulation, see generally David
W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379 (2005); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Default Rules in Private and
Public Law: Extending Default Rules Beyond Purely Economic Relationships: Information-Forcing
Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861 (2006).
182. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults:
Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 968–70 (2003).
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predominantly about efficiency of information transfer, but about improving
the process of decisionmaking. For example, forcing people or legal institutions
to confront and identify particular kinds of information may cause them to
better integrate that information into their own decisions. For these kinds of
disclosure rules, the generator and discloser of the information is also the entity
thought to be influenced by the information. It is information for the purpose of
self-communication. Relatedly, some analogs to information-forcing rules
improve decisionmaking process by communicating to the public so that the
public can participate in the deliberative process of lawmaking.
Examples of these kinds of rules abound in the legislative context. For
instance, scholars have sometimes treated various canons of statutory
interpretation as information-forcing. Textualism, the canon of constitutional
avoidance, clear statement rules, nondelegation doctrine, and the rule of lenity
may all be characterized as information-forcing in nature—they force legislators
to speak clearly and unambiguously to effectuate the goals of the legislation and
183
they minimize ambiguity in legislation. Some interpretative doctrines with
information-forcing features—the clear statement rule, for instance—may be
viewed as “collaborative,” inasmuch as they encourage dialogue between courts
184
and Congress. For clear statement rules, the argument goes, the Court informs
the legislature of what areas will be subject to the rule, the legislature then
decides whether to regulate in that area and what the basis of its regulatory
power is, and then the court reviews the sufficiency of the legislature’s
185
statement and reason for regulating. Similar arguments could be made about
186
information-forcing rules in the context of preemption.
And, some statutes formalize deliberative information-forcing rules—the
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act’s requirement that Congress give
consideration to the cost that federal legislation will impose on states, for
instance, or the National Environmental Protection Act’s requirement of

183. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 564–66 (2005) (acknowledging rules as informationforcing in theory, but arguing that they are not plausible because of heterogeneity of judiciary).
184. Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 827–28 (2005). The collaborative nature of clear statement rules can be
seen in the different aspects of the doctrine. First, the court identifies a zone of sensitivity, that is, an
area close to the boundary of legislative power, and specifies that the legislature must signal with some
degree of clarity that it is aware it is entering this zone. The court may also require that the legislature
identify the theory that would sustain its exercise of power within this zone, including any particular
findings necessary under that theory. Second, the legislature decides to enter the zone and attempts to
signal it is doing so, together with any required specification of theory and findings. Third, the court
reviews the legislative signal and, if appropriate, its explanation and findings in order to determine
whether they meet the requirements of the clear statement standard.
185. Id. at 828.
186. Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of
Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 256–58 (2007) (arguing for imposition of information-forcing rules
in preemption context to encourage “mobilization and robust exchanges between federal agencies and
state and public stakeholders”).
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environmental impact statements for federal agency action. These kinds of
information forcing rules are, in a sense, intended to increase costs on Congress
by forcing it to be explicit about the consequences and intent of proposed
legislation. In so doing, they may improve the substantive content of legislative
decisionmaking, separate and apart from transaction cost benefits. For instance,
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) has been associated with a
decrease in legislation containing unfunded mandates and also has been
188
thought to improve legislative deliberation. The UMRA also has decreased
transaction costs for regulated state and local governments by providing them
189
with better and earlier notice of unfunded mandates.
The final set of analogs to information-forcing rules may function to
improve the quality of primary decisionmaking by the public. Miranda is such
an information-forcing rule, with the goal of improving the decisionmaking
process of criminal suspects who may otherwise unknowingly waive their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Failure to warn liability
accomplishes some of the same goals with respect to consumer decisions.
Certain liability rules in the insurance context also are designed to improve
190
consumer decisionmaking. And some proposals have been made in the
context of regulation of sexual relations that are based on information-forcing
191
theories, for the purpose of improving decisionmaking by private citizens.
B. Pleading as Information-Forcing
Given these different purposes for information-forcing rules (efficiency,
process, and for primary decisionmaking), how does one evaluate the turn to
information-forcing principles in the pleading context? It should be obvious
that, at the pleading stage, it is unlikely that information-forcing rules imposed
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006) (NEPA); see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation
Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 17–19
(2009) (describing process imposed by UMRA). Krishnakumar proposes that a similar process be
required for legislation that might entrench on groups traditionally protected by Carolene Products
footnote 4.
188. Id. at 19–21.
189. Id. at 21.
190. Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1432 (2007) (noting that reasonable expectations doctrine in insurance
regulation [insurers are required to cover liabilities within reasonable expectations of consumers] is
information-forcing).
191. Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599,
631 (2005) (proposing the criminalization of “reckless sex” in part because of its information-forcing
effect—creating an incentive for first-time sexual partners to communicate about unprotected sex
reduces likelihood that there will be sex without consent); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law:
Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004)
(proposing information-forcing default rules in context of adultery laws to promote discussions among
sexual partners of monogamy and its alternatives). Universities have attempted to accomplish similar
goals through adoption of policies requiring explicit consent for sex between students. Antioch College
is perhaps most famous for this, but other campuses have similar codes. Antioch College Student
Handbook 14–15, available at http://antiochcollege.org/assets/files/StudentHandbook-4.pdf (visited
Mar. 13, 2011).
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on the pleader will affect primary behavior. By the time that a pleader has
instituted an action, relevant primary behavior has already transpired. Imposing
such rules might create incentives on those with better access to information to
take steps to guard that information, but this is likely not the kind of incentive
the law wants to create.
As for the process-based argument for information-forcing, some might
claim that requiring more detail from the pleader will ensure that a court has
better access to the information necessary to resolve litigation, and that more
192
detail is a better signal for the merits of the pleader’s case. And while it might
seem intuitive that additional detail will lead to better filtering, there is no
empirical data to support the proposition. It is possible that, instead of filtering
for merit, imposing a blanket information-forcing rule on plaintiffs may serve
simply to distinguish between plaintiffs with access to information and plaintiffs
without such access. Thus, to believe that blanket information-forcing will filter
for merit requires some reason to think that access to information is a good
193
proxy for having a meritorious case.
An efficiency-based information-forcing principle, however, could do some
work in the pleading context. In general, information-forcing rules based solely
on the information-generating justification are to be preferred when alternative
194
means of revealing the same information are more costly. One could see how,
for certain kinds of allegations—nature, time and place of injury, identity of
defendants, etc.—placing the burden on the plaintiff may be consistent with an
information-forcing rule focused on efficiency concerns. In the context of
pleading, one might also prefer information-forcing rules where one is
concerned that the pleader has withheld specific allegations for strategic
reasons. A similar argument has been made in the context of legislative gaps.
Scott Baker and Kimberly D. Krawiec have argued that where the legislature
leaves a statute incomplete for strategic reasons that suggest attempts to avoid
canons like the nondelegation doctrine, courts should be highly suspicious and
195
willing to strike the statute down. Baker and Krawiec distinguish strategic
192. In other work, I have challenged this assumption by showing that it is unlikely that application
of the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standards will improve the ability of courts to filter for merit at the
motion to dismiss stage. Reinert, supra note 4. While I do not claim that this work is dispositive,
Stephen Choi has come to similar conclusions after studying the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007) (concluding that despite Congress’s intent, the PSLRA likely
deterred the filing of a substantial number of meritorious cases).
193. It might be suggested that access to information could be a function of good (or some)
attorney representation, which itself may be a function of merit. This is a possibility, but requires
further empirical study.
194. Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and The
Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1841 (2007) (“Information-forcing rules are always
transaction-cost-saving mechanisms. They are desirable inasmuch as alternative ways for revealing the
information are more costly.”).
195. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663,
666–67 (2004) (on information-forcing grounds, proposing rule of statutory construction that penalizes
legislatures who strategically leave statute incomplete; as opposed to legislatures who leave statute
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withholding of information from cognitive limitations—essentially incomplete
information among the legislature itself—and in the latter suggest that courts
should presume the good faith of the legislature and engage in traditional
196
statutory interpretation. But where Congress has left a gap to avoid political
costs, shift responsibility for negative consequences, or obscure interest-group
197
rent-seeking, courts should be more skeptical.
Baker and Krawiec suggest a framework that might apply in the pleading
context. For legislation, they propose courts ask the following questions: (1) has
the legislature purposefully left the statute incomplete; (2) if so, is the reason
for the incompleteness a reasonable desire to harness agency or court expertise
or to avoid transaction costs of lawmaking; and (3) if not, is strategic
incompleteness likely to provide a benefit to legislators that outweighs the costs
198
of delegating to others law-interpreting power. The latter test will be satisfied
if there are high costs for legislation that does not work and few benefits to
legislators if legislation works or if powerful interest groups take opposing sides
199
on the issue. In the pleading context, a court might ask whether a pleader
obtains any strategic benefit by withholding from the defendant information to
which it has access. To do so, it may be necessary to ask whether the strategic
benefit obtained because of the procedural stage: that is, if the pleader will
ultimately disclose the information in discovery, is there any strategic advantage
to not disclosing it at the pleading stage?
It is important to recognize that information-forcing rules should not be
proposed solely for their own sake. Pleading rules still must be tailored to the
purposes of the Federal Rules—in the language of Twombly and Iqbal, they
must assure that complaints plausibly state a claim for relief. Thus, it is useful,
even after deciding that a particular kind of allegation, because of informational
asymmetry, is amenable to an information-forcing regime, to conduct another
evaluation to decide whether it makes sense to apply information-forcing at the
pleading stage rather than the discovery stage. This is a second and independent
requirement implicit in this article’s proposal. Determining whether pleading, as
opposed to discovery, is the proper stage for forcing information from a party
may depend on some of the strategic considerations discussed above or other
factors. For instance, in some circumstances, although information may typically
be of the kind that we would expect a plaintiff to plead—that is, the
responsibilities of different defendants in causing the plaintiff harm—the
specific circumstances of a case may make it impossible for a plaintiff to provide
200
such information at the pleading stage. Moreover, we might have substantive
incomplete for non-strategic reasons).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 672.
198. Id. at 684–85.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (not requiring
that plaintiff make separate allegations as to each defendant where plaintiff was not in room where
defendants executed search).
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commitments to certain kinds of claims—civil rights claims, for example—which
should cause hesitation when imposing information-forcing rules. The point
here is only that to the extent courts add information-forcing rules to the notice
pleading regime that predated Twombly and Iqbal, it should be with some
consciousness of the ways in which information-forcing rules function in other
contexts.
Importantly, to some extent this proposal—that heightened pleading under
Twombly and Iqbal be limited to circumstances in which plaintiffs are at an
informational advantage and where there is a good reason to require disclosure
of that information at the pleading stage—is consistent with the way in which
some lower courts have resolved the conundrum posed by the Supreme Court’s
changes in pleading. When a lower court excuses the presence of thin pleadings
because of informational asymmetry, it is essentially doing precisely what is
proposed here: taking account of when it makes sense to force information from
the plaintiff at the pleading stage. Where the plaintiff cannot provide the
information because it is unavailable to her, it makes little sense to apply a
pleading standard beyond that mandated by notice pleading.
VI
CONCLUSION
There is much to quarrel with in the proposal here. For those who support
the Court’s recent turn to heightened pleading, it is arguably inconsistent with
Iqbal and Twombly, which both suggest blunt instrumentation in evaluating
pleadings. At the same time, however, Iqbal speaks of the importance of
context in pleading determinations, and it is sensible to take account of the
context of informational equity discussed here.
For those, including this author, who believe that the turn away from notice
pleading is a mistake, the proposal made here may appear to cede too much
ground. But it is well to remember that the ground is shifting as we speak.
Lower courts are standing on the fault lines, and absent a return to the notice
pleading regime that prevailed before 2007, a principled ground for applying
the teachings of Iqbal and Twombly is preferable to ad hoc applications of
“judicial experience and common sense.”

